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opportunities due to vertical integration, or due to
the building of supplier relations (Karlsson,
Johansson, & Stough 2012; Kim & Zhang, 2008; Lutz,
Talavera, & Park, 2008; Hsu, 2002).1
Furthermore, international and institutional
investors as well as large shareholders can be seen
as potential controllers of equity agency problems as
their increased shareholdings can give them a
stronger incentive to monitor local managerial
behavior
and
firm
performance.
Corporate
governance and in particular ownership structure
can be an effective tool to control the opportunistic
behaviour of management (Fauzi & Locke, 2012;
Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012; Grygorenko &
Lutz, 2007).
So far only a few studies have attempted to
examine this relationship for Middle Eastern and

1. INTRODUCTION
Issues of economic development and the interaction
of multinational enterprise (MNE) presence and
formation and success of local firms in developing
countries have dominated the research agenda at
various policy levels. One major element of
successful development in the Middle East and
Africa is the formation of a viable local industry and
in particular small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) (Rocha, Farazi, Khouri, & Pearce, 2011; Abor &
Quartey, 2010; Brixovia, 2010; Quartey, 2003).
Another major element is the development of
export-capability into international markets of
developed and emerging economies (Mareike,
Wohlmuth, Knedlik, Pitamber, & Gutowski, 2004;
Zaiem, 2012). The presence of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) and their interaction with local
SMEs may play a major role here (Larue de
Tournemine, Kern, & Bissiriou, 2009). MNEs may
transfer technology to local SMEs, create export

1

On the other hand, MNEs may crowd out local economic activity and
thereby hinder local development of SMEs and of a related viable export
sector; see Abor and Quartey (2010), Weidenbaum (2000).
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African economies and there remain large gaps in
our knowledge concerning the relationship between
ownership structures and local firm performance.
This paper contributes to filling this existing
research gap by investigating firms in the MENA
region. We examine the impact of corporate
governance and ownership structure on firm
performance using cross-sectional data from
companies in the MENA region for the years 2009
to 2013.
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 introduces the economic and
institutional background and the hypotheses to be
investigated. Section 3 describes the research
methodology. Section 4 presents the general
modeling and summarizes the results. Section 5
concludes.

2. LITERATURE
DEVELOPMENT

REVIEW

AND

shareholders’ interest in a competitive environment
while maintaining managerial accountability to
provide a great and effective firm performance. Most
empirical studies find that board composition is
affected not only by those corporate governance
mechanisms but also by other variables, including
firm size and firm performance. Finally, a good
corporate governance framework can benefit the
firm with easier financing, lower costs of capital,
improved stakeholder favor, and overall better
company performance (Fauzi & Locke, 2012;
Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).
Corporate governance is divided into two
contrasting approaches: shareholder approach and
stakeholder approach. Such a division is based on
the purpose of the firm and its structure of
governance arrangements described, explained, and
justified by the two approaches. According to the
shareholder approach, corporations should be
controlled to maximize shareholders’ wealth and the
shareholders should be allocated decision rights.
Thus, the managers are supposed to serve the
shareholders. The managers should take into
account the interests of the shareholders when
making decisions about the firm’s major policy,
organization, and management. The stakeholder
approach views the shareholder approach posits
that shareholders should control the firm because
they are residual claimants and their interests
should be served because they are risk bearers. The
major challenge to the ‘shareholder sovereignty’ is
the stakeholder approach, which suggests that
managers
should
take
into
account
their
responsibilities
to
stakeholders
not
just
shareholders when making decisions. These two
approaches can be regarded as competing
explanations of the operations of a firm (Lee, 2009;
Pan, Lin, & Chen, 2013).
According to the agency theory, in the
shareholders approach, the ownership structure is
considered one of the most important corporate
governance mechanisms that affect a firm’s
performance. From a theoretical point of view,
agency problems may affect the value of firms
through the expected cash flow accruing to investors
or the cost of capital. First, agency problems are
decreased when good corporate governance is
offered which also makes the investors optimistic
about future cash flows. Second, good corporate
governance lowers the cost of capital to the extent
that it reduces shareholders’ monitoring and audit
costs (Kim & Yoon, 2007; Lee, 2009).
Corporate governance has been a dominant
policy issue and a much-debated topic of academic
research. In addition to theoretical interest, issues of
corporate governance have practical appeal; it has
been shown in various contexts that better corporate
governance is associated with higher firm financial
performance. Corporate governance can be viewed
as a mechanism that ensures external investors
receive proper returns on their investments.
Effective corporate governance provides assurance
on the safety of the invested funds and the returns
on investment The corporate governance framework
should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is
made of all material matters regarding the
corporation, including the financial situation,
performance, ownership, and governance of the

HYPOTHESES

Corporate governance is the complex system by
which
corporations
are
managed,
directed,
administered, or controlled. Corporations are
complicated organizations and analysing their
governance systems is a challenging task. Many
theorists
have
been
working
towards
an
understanding of the essentials of corporate
governance structures.
Corporate governance is intended to develop
ownership structures and corporate governance
structures for companies in order to make sure that
managers behave ethically and make the right
decisions that benefit shareholders. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) propose agency theory, which
suggests that in a lot of organizations there is a
separation between ownership which are the
principal and management which are the agents, this
separation of ownership and management may lead
to
agency
problems,
including
excessive
consumption and under-investment decisions. Fama
and Jensen (1983) suggest that boards reduce
agency problems when the board separates
management from control aspects of the decision
making process (Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Lee, 2009).
The board of directors plays an important role
in maintaining effective corporate governance,
particularly in publicly held corporations in which
agency problems may arise from the separation of
ownership and control. The management body in a
firm is responsible for suggesting and implementing
major policies; however, shareholders do not always
agree with these policies, which can lead to agency
problems between management and shareholders.
The board of directors is considered one of several
ways that can reduce agency conflicts within the
firm. Capital structure, insider ownership, and block
ownership are also effective in controlling agency
problems (Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Syriopoulos &
Tsatsaronis, 2012).
Moreover, in an effective and productive work
environment, boards become very important for the
smooth functioning of organizations. Boards are
expected to perform different functions. For
example, monitoring of management in order to
decrease agency costs, hiring and firing of
management, providing and giving access to
resources, and finally, providing the firm with
strategic directions. Boards also seek to protect
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company (Mohamed, Oyelere, & Al Jifri, 2009; Lee,
2009; Bijalwan & Madan, 2013).
A corporate governance structure combines
controls, policies, and guidelines that drive the
organization toward its objectives while also
satisfying
stakeholders’
needs.
A
corporate
governance structure is often a combination of
various mechanisms. The foremost sets of controls
for a corporation come from its internal
mechanisms. These controls monitor the progress
and activities of the organization and take corrective
actions when the business goes off track.
Maintaining the corporation’s larger internal control
fabric, they serve the internal objectives of the
corporation and its internal stakeholders, including
employees, managers, and owners. However,
external mechanisms are controlled by those outside
an organization and serve the objectives of entities
such as regulators, governments, trade unions, and
financial institutions.
Recent researches focus on the determinants of
corporate governance on firm performance; in
particular, board structure, CEO characteristics, and
ownership structure have been identified as key
components for a firm’s governance practices. Firms
who have higher managerial ownership, less
executive compensation, and more independent
directors will have stronger governance and better
firm performance (Pan, Lin, & Chen, 2013).

Chen, 2013). Insider ownership has an important
impact on corporate financial performance. Insider
ownership can improve company performance
because working owners are not willing to avert
resources away from firm value maximization.
However, an optimal level of insider ownership is
determined by firm size, industry, investor
protection level, and performance of the firm
(Wellalage & Locke, 2012; Pan, Lin, & Chen, 2013).
Pan, Lin, and Chen (2013) found a positive
relationship between insider ownership and firm
performance, also Wellalage and Locke (2012) found
a positive relationship between insider ownership
and
firm
performance, therefore,
and
we
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a significant
relationship between insider ownership and book
value performance.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): There is a significant
relationship between insider ownership and ROA.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): There is a significant
relationship between insider ownership and ROE.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a significant
relationship between insider ownership and market
value performance.
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): There is a significant
relationship between insider ownership and Tobin’s Q.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): There is a significant
relationship between insider ownership and SR.

2.1. Ownership concentration

2.3. Foreign ownership

Ownership concentration has been suggested as an
effective way to reduce the agency problem.
Ownership concentration gives large shareholders
concentrated control rights and the incentives to
monitor management, thereby convincing managers
to maximize shareholders’ wealth and enhance
performance (Lee, 2009; Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2012;
Huang & Boateng, 2013; Mohamed & Basuony, 2015).
Lee (2009) argues that there is a significant linear
and humped shaped relationship between ownership
concentration and firm performance. However,
Huang and Boateng (2013), Alimehmeti and Paletta
(2012) found a positive relationship between
ownership concentration and firm performance.
Therefore we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a significant
relationship between ownership concentration and
book value performance.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): There is a significant
relationship between ownership concentration and ROA.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): There is a significant
relationship between ownership concentration and ROE.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a significant
relationship between ownership concentration and
market value performance.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): There is a significant
relationship between ownership concentration and
Tobin’s Q.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): There is a significant
relationship between ownership concentration and SR.

Foreign investment literature has mentioned that
firms, in which there is a higher share of foreign
ownership will perform better than their domestic
ownerships. Foreign investors demand higher
standards of corporate governance that’s why firms
benefit from a high level of foreign ownership (Lee,
2009). An increase in the number of foreign
ownership in a firm will increase the firm
performance because foreign ownership plays a
monitoring role in the corporate governance
mechanism of the firm. Foreign ownership has a
positive effect on firm performance because foreign
investors can achieve better financial, technological
resources and experience than the domestic
investors and can transfer these attributes to the
firms (Phung & Le, 2013; Huang & Shiu,2009). Phung
and Le (2013) found a negative relationship between
firm performance and foreign ownership. Huang and
Shiu (2009) have found a positive relationship
between foreign ownership and firm performance
therefore we hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): There is a significant
relationship between foreign ownership and book
value performance.
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): There is a significant
relationship between foreign ownership and ROA.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): There is a significant
relationship between foreign ownership and ROE.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): There is a significant
relationship between foreign ownership and market
value performance.
Hypothesis 6a (H6a): There is a significant
relationship between foreign ownership and Tobin’s Q.
Hypothesis 6b (H6b): There is a significant
relationship between foreign ownership and SR.

2.2. Insider ownership
Insiders refer to employees, directors, and managers
who enjoy information advantage about the firm
over the market. Insider ownership may also
perform a monitoring role for the firm. (Pan, Lin, &
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2.4. Institutional ownership

2.6. Independent executive directors

In order to push management towards policies that
will benefit shareholders, institutional investors
must have the resource and ability to properly
monitor management decisions and the size of
ownership stakes. Firms can hire institutional
investors to monitor corporate managers; however
institutional investors do not get any incentives for
monitoring thus institutional investors have no
direct financial stake in the firm they invest in (Lee,
2009; Pan, Lin, & Chen, 2013). Institutional investors
can act for their own interests, not for the interest of
the shareholders. Institutional investors may have
shareholding in multiple firms which means that
they may not be good monitors of the management,
which may lead to having high returns and risky
projects (Lee, 2009). Lee (2009) found a negative
relationship between institutional ownership and
firm performance; however, Pan, Lin, and Chen
(2013), Hartzell and Straks (2003) found a positive
relationship between institutional ownership and
firm performance. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 7 (H7): There is a significant
relationship between institutional ownership and
book value performance.
Hypothesis 7a (H7a): There is a significant
relationship between institutional ownership and ROA.
Hypothesis 7b (H7b): There is a significant
relationship between institutional ownership and ROE.
Hypothesis 8 (H8): There is a significant
relationship between institutional ownership and
market value performance.
Hypothesis 8a (H8a): There is a significant
relationship between institutional ownership and
Tobin’s Q.
Hypothesis 8b (H8b): There is a significant
relationship between institutional ownership and SR.

Independent directors are non-executive or nonemployee directors, who may perhaps play a more
effective role in monitoring management to meet
shareholders’ expectations. Some studies reached a
result that having a large number of outside
independent directors may lower the risk that the
mangers will manipulate the finances and earnings
management, so a greater number of outside
directors have a positive relationship with company
performance (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Chiang & Lin,
2011). In addition, agency theory claimed that
greater board independence allows good monitoring
of self-interest pursuits as a result it minimizes
opportunities for fraud and agency costs (Basuony,
Mohamed, & Al-Baidhani, 2014). Ferrer and
Banderlipe (2012), Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008)
claim that as the outside directors do not hold any
managerial roles in the firm and corporate boards
do not meet frequently, as a result of this less
cohesiveness takes place affecting management’s
interest and values. Pan, Lin, and Chen (2013) argue
that there is a positive relationship between
independent directors and firm performance; also
Chiang and Lin’s (2011) results show a positive
relationship between independent directors and firm
performance. Mashayekhi and Bazaz’s (2008) results
show a negative relationship between board
independence and firm performance. Therefore we
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 11 (H11): There is a significant
relationship between Independent board directors
and book value performance.
Hypothesis 11a (H11a): There is a significant
relationship between Independent board directors
and ROA.
Hypothesis 11b (H11b): There is a significant
relationship between Independent board directors
and ROE.
Hypothesis 12 (H12): There is a significant
relationship between Independent board directors
and market value performance.
Hypothesis 12a (H12a): There is a significant
relationship between Independent board directors
and Tobin’s Q.
Hypothesis 12b (H12b): There is a significant
relationship between Independent board directors
and SR.

2.5. Board size
According to agency theory, it is argued that a large
board is more likely to be alert for agency problems
that’s because a huge number of people will be
monitoring management actions. According to the
resource dependence theory, it is argued that large
boards bring a greater opportunity for more links
and hence access to resources. However, Jensen
(1986) also suggests that smaller boards enhance
communication, cohesiveness, and coordination,
which make monitoring more effective (Fauzi &
Locke, 2012; Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008; Basuony &
Mohamed, 2014). Other scholars found a positive
relationship
between
board
size
and
firm
performance (Mertzanis, Basuony, & Mohamed, 2019;
Fauzi & Locke, 2012) therefore we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 9 (H9): There is a significant
relationship between board size and book value
performance.
Hypothesis 9a (H9a): There is a significant
relationship between board size and ROA.
Hypothesis 9b (H9b): There is a significant
relationship between board size and ROE.
Hypothesis 10 (H10): There is a significant
relationship between board size and market value
performance.
Hypothesis 10a (H10a): There is a significant
relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q.
Hypothesis 10b (H10b): There is a significant
relationship between board size and SR.

2.7. Board committees
Most of the firms have audit committees and
remuneration in order to check the audit of financial
statements and to set up remuneration for executive
officers and directors. These committees are
important as they ensure that the financial
procedure is well and the directors are compensated,
in order to prevent agency problems. These studies
are helpful in order to improve our understanding of
the relationship between committees, agency
problems, and firm performance (Fauzi & Locke,
2012). Firms could improve their reporting quality
by properly structuring their audit committees,
leading to reducing their cost of capital. In order to
have an effective nomination committee. The
nomination
committee
should
ensure
the
appointment of non-executive directors whose
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interests are aligned with those of the shareholders
and reduce any agency problems (Fauzi & Locke,
2012; Felo, Krishnamurthy, & Solieri, 2003). Fauzi and
Locke (2012) found a positive relationship between a
board of committees and firm performance however,
therefore we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 13 (H13): There is a significant
relationship between Board committee and book
value performance.
Hypothesis 13a (H13a): There is a significant
relationship between Board committee and ROA.
Hypothesis 13b (H13b): There is a significant
relationship between Board committee and ROE.
Hypothesis 14 (H14): There is a significant
relationship between Board committee and market
value performance.
Hypothesis 14a (H14a): There is a significant
relationship between Board committee and Tobin’s Q.
Hypothesis 14b (H14b): There is a significant
relationship between Board committee and SR.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The sample is collected from local stock market data
and includes manufacturing and services companies
operating in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon,
Jordan, and six GCC countries for the years 2009
until 2013. Manufacturing companies are divided
into six sectors (energy, material, industry,
consumer discretionary, consumer staples). Service
companies are divided into six sectors (consumer
discretionary, consumer staples, health care,
Information technology, telecommunication services,
utilities), companies that did not have financial
reports are excluded from the sample. Table 1
summarizes the sample selection process.
Table 1. Sample by country
Countries
Bahrain
Egypt
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
United Arab
Emirates
Total

2.8. CEO duality
The two outstanding theories concerning the
relationship between CEO duality and company
performance inside the structure of the board of
directors are the agency theory and stewardship
theory. Stewardship theory defines the manger as a
steward who gains a sense of achievement by being
high performing and taking actions that are
beneficial to the shareholders’ profits. According to
the agency theory, some researchers have found that
CEO duality can lead to a lower level of supervision
of the general manager by the board, therefore
creating a less desirable situation for company
performance (Chiang & Lin, 2011; Syriopoulos &
Tsatsaronis, 2012). Researchers claimed that when
the CEO is also the chairperson that means gaining
complete authority, this can lead to reducing the
potential conflict between management and then the
board is reduced, leading to a higher performance
level. To summarize, there have been mixed findings
on the relationship between CEO duality and
company performance (Chiang & Lin, 2011). Chiang
and Lin (2011) found a negative relationship
between CEO duality and firm performance,
therefore we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 15 (H15): There is a significant
relationship between CEO duality and book value
performance.
Hypothesis 15a (H15a): There is a significant
relationship between CEO duality and ROA.
Hypothesis 15b (H15b): There is a significant
relationship between CEO duality and ROE.
Hypothesis 16 (H16): There is a significant
relationship between CEO duality and market value
performance.
Hypothesis 16a (H16a): There is a significant
relationship between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q.
Hypothesis 16b (H16b): There is a significant
relationship between CEO duality and SR.

All listed
companies
3
14
7
18
1
7
15
14
100
16

Unavailable
data
(2)
(3)
(1)
(6)

Total

%

3
14
7
18
1
5
12
14
99
10

1.5 %
7.0 %
3.5 %
9.1 %
0.5 %
2.5 %
6.1 %
7.1 %
49.7 %
5.1 %

16

-

16

8.0 %

211

(12)

199

100 %

Table 1 shows 211 firms from 11 countries
based on the market capitalization of the firms that
have been registered in the stock markets of these
11 countries; 3 firms from Bahrain, 14 firms from
Egypt, 7 firms from Jordan, 18 firms from Kuwait,
1 firm from Lebanon, 7 firms from Morocco,
15 firms from Oman, 14 firms from Qatar, 100 firms
from Saudi Arabia, 16 firms from Tunisia, and
finally 16 firms from United Arab of Emirates. Nine
firms were excluded as they do not have audited
financial reports. The total of the firms that are used
in the sample is 199 firms after excluding 2 from
Morocco, 3 from Oman, 1 from Saudi Arabia, 6 from
Tunisia. Finally, the firms in Saudi Arabia have the
highest percentage (47%) for the sample of this
study based on market capitalization.

3.1. Measurement of variables
The following dependent variables are used for
measuring the firm performance: ROA, ROE,
Tobin’s Q, and stock return. Independent variables
used for corporate governance mechanisms are
ownership
concentration,
insider
ownership,
institutional ownership, foreign ownership, CEO
duality, board size, independent boards, and audit
committee. Control variables include firm size,
leverage, and liquidity. These data collected from the
Orbis database. Table 2 shows the definition and
measurement of these variables.
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Table 2. Definition of variables
Variables symbols
Dependent variables
ROA
ROE
Tobin’s Q
SR
Independent variables
OwnCon
OwnConperc
InsidOwn
InsidOwnper
InstOwn

Definition

Measurements

Return on assets
Return on equity
Tobin’s Q
Stock return

Net income/total assets
Net income/total equity
(MV (CS) + BV (PS) + BV (LTD) + BV (INV) + BV (CL) – BV (CA))/BV (TA)
Average of the monthly change in stock prices * 12

Ownership concentration
Ownership concentration
Insider ownership
Insider ownership
Institutional ownership

InstOwnper

Institutional ownership

FrgnOwn
FrgnOwnper
CEODuality
BrdSize
BrdIndp
Audit committee
Control variables
FirmSize
Leverage
Liquidity

Foreign ownership
Foreign ownership
CEO duality
Board size
Independent board
Audit committee

If ownership concentration exists = 1; otherwise = 0
Adding up all shareholding of 5% or more
If insider ownership exists = 1; otherwise = 0
Percentage of shares held by the board members
If institutional ownership exists = 1; otherwise = 0
Percentage of shares held by institutional investors (banks, pension
fund insurance companies and mutual funds)
If foreign ownership exists = 1; otherwise = 0
% of shares by for. inv.
If the CEO & Chairman are the same person = 0; otherwise = 1
Total number of board members
Number of non-executive members on the board
If audit committee exists = 1; otherwise = 0

Firm size
Leverage
Liquidity

Natural log of total sales
Long term debt/total assets
Current assets/current liability

firm-specific effects; the case where these effects are
fixed, that is determinate constants instead of
random variables, is a special sub-case. Model
variants reported below were estimated with OLS or
RE panel models and with lagged explanatory
variables. All models were also run with controls for
years, countries, and industries (where appropriate).
The data available contains several firmspecific, time-invariant variables that can be
assumed to capture a significant part of present
fixed effects (e.g., country, industry indicators).
Hence a random-effects specification seems to be a
priori more appropriate.

3.2. Econometric modeling
Given the panel data available, we can use the
following
generalized
regression
model
to
investigate the economic hypotheses presented:
(1)
where the dependent variable
is a profit or sales
level indicator (e.g. ROE or ROA) of a company i in
period t;
is a vector of determinants specific to
firm i but invariant over time (such as country or
industry);
is a vector of determinants that may
vary between firms and also over time (e.g., sales);
is a vector of period-specific determinants
outside of a particular firm (typically captured by
year);
is an idiosyncratic error term that may vary
between firms and also over time and is
independently distributed with E( ) = 0; and
represents unobserved heterogeneity across firms,
i.e., a company-specific random effect that is
independently distributed.
This general specification allows for either
ordinary least-squares (OLS), random-effects (RE), or
fixed-effects (FE) modeling, where the random or
fixed effects are firm-specific components. The more
general approach is to allow for random

4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Four models are used in order to test the hypotheses
stated above. These models use ROA, ROE,
Tobin’s Q, and stock return, respectively, as
dependent variables. They are first estimated using
cross-sectional OLS; subsequently, these models are
also estimated using random-effects (RE) models.
Tables 3 and 4 below summarize the results; this is
followed by detailed discussions.
Model 1 is used in order to test the effect of
corporate
governance
mechanisms
on
firm
performance using return on assets ROA. This
model takes the form:
(2)

Model 1 examines the relationships between,
leverage,
liquidity,
firm
size,
board
size,
independent
board,
ownership
concentration,
insider ownership, institutional ownership, foreign
ownership, CEO duality and industry and firm
performance measured as ROA. The model is highly
significant (F = 14.379, p = 0.000) and an adjusted
R-squared of 0.178 explains about 18 percent of the
variation in return on assets.
Leverage appears to have a negative and
statistically significant effect on ROA. This result is
consistent with previous studies (Jensen, 1986;

Myers, 1984). Liquidity appears to have a positive
and statistically significant effect on firm
performance (ROA). This result is consistent with
Lee’s (2009).
Firm size appears to have a positive and
statistically significant effect on ROA; revealing that
large firms appear to have intrinsic advantages as
compared to smaller firms. These advantages may
include wide recognition as well as easier access to
capital. This result is consistent with previous studies
(Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006; Tian & Zeitun, 2007).
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Ownership concentration percentage appears
to have a positive and statistically significant effect
on ROA. Ownership concentration is suggested to be
an effective way to mitigate the agency problems, as
ownership concentration gives large shareholders
concentrated control rights and the incentive to
monitor management thereby, compelling managers
to maximize shareholders’ wealth and enhance
performance. This result is in line with the study of
Huang and Boateng (2013). On the other hand, other
scholars have a negative association between
ownership concentration and firm performance
which is not consistent with the results of this study
(Basuony, Mohamed, & Ahmed, 2017; Belkhir, 2005).
Insider ownership and insider ownership
percentage share appear to have positive and

statistically significant effects on firm performance
(ROA). These results support the agency theory that
higher insider ownership should reduce costs and
hence increase firm performance. These results are
consistent with previous studies (Pan, Lin, &
Chen, 2013; Wellalage & Locke, 2012; Basuony,
Mohamed, Hussain, & Marie, 2016).
Foreign ownership appears to have a negative
and statistically significant effect on firm
performance (ROA). When foreign ownership reaches
a certain level, foreign investors become controlling
shareholders, and this may destroy firm value
because foreign controlling owners may use firm
operations solely to their own benefit, e.g. by asset
stripping. This result is consistent with Phung and
Le (2013).

Table 3. OLS models
Model
OLS 1
OLS 2
OLS 3
OLS 4
Dependent variable
ROA
ROE
Tobin’s Q
SR
Leverage
-.154***
-.196***
2.127**
-.114**
Liquidity
.003***
.001
-.040
.003
FirmSize
.004***
.013***
-.337***
.003
BrdSize
.001
.001
.211***
-.011**
BrdIndp
-.017
-.021
-1.308*
.045
OwnCon
.006
.009
-1.574***
.066
OwnConper
.053***
.066**
1.580*
-.081
InsidOwn
.016**
.007
-.014
.073**
InsidOwnper
.047***
.081***
-1.908**
-.147**
InstOwn
.011
.010
-1.561***
.020
InstOwnper
.014
.033
.206
.044
FrgnOwn
-.015*
-.007
.113
-.037
FrgnOwnper
.020
-.002
3.456***
-.029
CEODuality
.007
-.017
.590
.038
Observations
995
995
995
995
Groups (firms)
199
199
199
199
F-statistic
14.379
9.465
4.729
2.119
Prob > F
0.000
0.000
.000
.006
R-squared
.191
.135
.072
.034
R-squared adjusted
.178
.121
.057
.018
Max VIF
3.703
3.703
3.703
3.703
Notes: Variables as listed in Table 2. All models estimated with ordinary least squares. All equations include a constant and
industry effects. *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level.

Model 2 is used in order to test the effect of
corporate governance mechanisms on return on
equity ROE. Besides using a different independent
variable, its structure is identical to that of Model 1.
Leverage appears to have a negative and
statistically significant effect on ROE. Firm size
appears to have an effect on a positive and
statistically significant effect on firm performance
(ROE). Insider ownership and insider ownership
percentage share appear to have positive and
statistically significant effects on firm performance
(ROE). Ownership concentration percentage appears
to have a positive and statistically significant
effect on ROA.
Model 3 examines the effect of corporate
governance mechanisms on Tobin’s Q. Besides using
a different independent variable, its structure is
identical to that of the previous two models.
Leverage appears to have a positive and statistically
significant effect on Tobin’s Q. This result is
consistent with McConnell and Servaes’ (1995).
Board size appears to have a positive and
statistically significant effect on Tobin’s Q. Board size
supports agency theory and resource dependence, as
larger board size creates greater firm value and hence
supports the testable hypotheses. The positive
coefficient of the board size suggests that large

boards are effective mechanisms for monitoring
manager’s performance and achieving long term
strategic goals in such firms. This result is consistent
with Fauzi and Locke (2012).
Independent board of directors appears to have
a negative and statistically significant effect on
Tobin’s Q. This negative relationship may be caused
by a very high block holders ownership
concentration, which can interfere with effective
corporate governance of the firm and as a
consequence, the independent board of directors
may not play a pivotal role in effective governance
of the firm. This result is consistent with
Mashayekhi and Bazaz’s (2008).
The ownership concentration percentage share
appears to have a positive and statistically
significant effect on Tobin’s Q. However, ownership
concentration appears to have a negative and
statistically significant effect on Tobin’s Q. This may
indicate that ownership concentration per se is bad.
This might be caused by the nature of ownership in
some firms in Middle Eastern and North African
countries where the higher the ownership level the
more potential there is for agency problems. And
excessive ownership concentration in the firms may
be detrimental to firm performance.
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Insider ownership percentage appears to have a
negative and statistically significant effect on
Tobin’s Q. As some points of higher insider
ownership may be detrimental to the firm’s
performance.
Institutional ownership appears to have a
negative and statistically significant effect on
Tobin’s Q. Institutional investors may act in their own
interest and not in the interest of the shareholders.
Principal-agent problems may happen between
shareholders and institutional investors. Institutional
investors may have shares in multiple firms that may
not be good monitors of management; that, in turn,
may lead to the adoption of risky high-return projects
leading to lower firm performance. This result is
consistent with Lee’s (2009).
Foreign ownership percentages appear to have
a positive and statistically significant effect on
Tobin’s Q. As foreign ownership has a positive effect
on firm performance because foreign investors may
provide better financing and resources, and may
transfer technology to local firms. This result is
consistent with Huang and Shui’s (2009).
Finally, Model 4 examines the effect of corporate
governance mechanisms on stock return. Besides
using a different independent variable, this model is
identical to the previous three models. Leverage
appears to have a negative and statistically significant
effect on firm performance (stock returns).
Board size appears to have a negative and
statistically significant effect on stock returns. As if
board size is large, board members may find efficient
communication more difficult and also a large board
of directors may lack genuine interactions and debate,
thus increase the CEO’s power.

Insider ownership appears to have a positive
and statistically significant effect on stock returns.
Insider ownership percentage appears to have a
negative and statistically significant effect on stock
returns. As some points of higher insider ownership
may be detrimental to a firm’s performance.
Next, we reestimate all models using a
random-effects
model
(RE).
Table 4
below
summarizes the results; this is followed by a
discussion of their significance. Model 1 examines
the effect of ownership structures and board
structures on firm performance measured by ROA.
The random-effects model is highly significant as
indicated by the R-squared; this is partly due to the
use of controls and a lagged dependent variable.
Noteworthy is in this estimation that both the share
of foreign ownership as well as ownership
concentration appear to have significant positive
effects on firm performance. This confirms the
results of our OLS estimations presented above.
Model 2 examines the effect of ownership
structures
and
board
structures
on
firm
performance
measured
by
ROE.
Ownership
concentration, inside ownership, and the share of
foreign ownership appear to have significant
positive effects on firm performance. The share of
institutional ownership seems to have a negative
effect. This confirms the results of our OLS
estimations presented above.
According to Model 3, the share of institutional
ownership seems to have a positive effect on
Tobin’s Q. This contradicts our earlier results.
Furthermore, Models 2, 3, and 4 indicate that the
share of inside ownership has a negative influence
on performance indicators.

Table 4. RE models
Model
RE 1
RE 2
RE 3
RE 4
Dependent variable
ROA
ROE
Tobin’s Q
SR
Leverage
-.046***
-.687***
1.115*
.012
Liquidity
.001***
.002
-0.049***
.000
FirmSize
.002
.049***
-0.328***
-.008
BrdSize
.001
-.019**
-0.010
-.008
BrdIndp
.002
.019
-0.669
.034
OwnCon
.016**
.104*
-0.217
.068
OwnConper
.008
.180*
-0.157
-.091
InsidOwn
.007
.159**
-0.335
-.014
InsidOwnper
.005
-.435***
-1.262*
-.134*
InstOwn
-.001
.013
-0.472
.037
InstOwnper
-.001
-.216*
1.498**
.076
FrgnOwn
.000
-.084
0.334
.050
FrgnOwnper
.031*
.331**
0.498
-.123
CEODuality
-.010
-.076
0.165
-.040
Observations
796
796
796
796
Groups (firms)
199
199
199
199
Wald Chi
1247
76
1165
92
P > Chi2
.000
.000
.000
.000
R-squared within
.003
.011
.080
.105
R-squared between
.920
.252
.893
.170
R-squared overall
.620
.090
.776
.108
Notes: Variables as listed in Table 2. All models estimated with random effects. All equations include a constant, lagged
dependent variable, and controls for industry, country, and year. *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 11% level.

with previous literature, we assume that this
support may be provided by international and
institutional investors as well as large shareholders.
International and institutional investors as well as
large shareholders can be seen as potential
controllers of equity agency problems as their
increased shareholdings can give them a stronger
incentive to monitor local managerial behaviour and

5. CONCLUSION
The results presented above may suggest some
prevalent features with respect to the ownership and
performance of firms in the MENA region. Due to the
volatile social and business environment, these firms
operate in, they may be particularly dependent on
effective ownership structures and support. In line
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firm
performance.
International
owners,
in
particular, may be providers of equity and debt
financing, technology transfers to local firms, global
export opportunities, and global supply chain
relationships.
Our results indicate that a higher foreign
ownership share is positively associated with higher
firm performance measured by ROA, ROE, and
Tobin’s Q (OLS estimations only). Furthermore, we
find that ownership concentration and insider
ownership are positively associated with firm
performance measured by ROA, ROE (RE estimations
only), and stock returns (OLS estimations only).
These findings are consistent with the story
outlined above and, in turn, lead to questions
about how exactly that international support is
provided and how it interacts with other
performance factors of Middle Eastern and African
firms. Answering these questions will be the subject
of future research. Insider ownership is positively
associated with firm performance measured by ROA,
ROE (RE estimations only), and stock returns
(OLS estimations only). However, an increasing share
of inside ownership appears to have a negative
influence on Tobin’s Q and stock returns, while
the effects on ROA and ROE are unclear. Results are
also unclear with respect to the influence of
institutional ownership.

The limitations of this study due to the small
sample of firms investigated. Further research might
therefore also include examining a larger number of
Middle Eastern and African firms. This will allow for
an examination of the interaction between different
ownership aspects of firm performance.
Corporate governance and ownership structure,
in particular diversified ownership including foreign
MNE owners, play a major role in promoting growth
and development by local firms and industries in
developing countries. International owners may
provide equity and debt financing, transfer
technology
to
local
firms,
create
export
opportunities due to vertical integration or due to
the building of supplier relations. Furthermore,
international and institutional investors as well as
large shareholders can be seen as potential
controllers of equity agency problems as their
increased shareholdings can give them a stronger
incentive to monitor local managerial behaviour and
firm performance. For regulators and governors,
Corporate governance in particular ownership
structure can be an effective tool to control the
opportunistic behaviours of management. So far
only a few studies have attempted to examine this
relationship for Middle Eastern and African
economies and there remain large gaps in our
knowledge concerning the relationship between
ownership structures and local firm performance.
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APPENDIX. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variables
ROA
ROE
Tobin’s Q
SR
Leverage
Liquidity
FirmSize
Audit committee
BrdSize
BrdIndp
OwnCon
OwnConper
InsidOwn
InsidOwnper
InstOwn
InstOwnper
FrgnOwn
FrgnOwnper
CEODuality
Sector
Industry
Country

N
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990
990

Minimum
-.38010
-.98568
.00946
-1.21937
.00000
.06450
15.60259
1
4
.00000
0
.00000
0
.00000
0
.00000
0
.00000
0
1
1
1

Maximum
.53985
.73179
6.31464
1.95874
.96301
6.66852
25.82562
1
17
1.00000
1
1.00000
1
.95000
1
1.00000
1
.93930
1
9
2
11
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Mean
.0750525
.1228853
2.2268472
.1473492
.1783569
2.4967222
2.0282359
1.00
8.48
.5132783
.85
.4032553
.72
.1271168
.71
.3115760
.21
.0549809
.97
3.39
1.42
7.65

Standard deviation
.08713351
.15056462
4.69086248
.34109594
.18652246
3.37537889
1.90182542
.000
2.383
.22138663
.353
.29036315
.452
.19704502
.456
.29669144
.405
.16618937
.172
2.200
.493
2.664

